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That's the difficulty in these times, ideals, dreams and cherished 
hopes rise within us, only to meet the horrible truth and be 
shattered. It's really a wonder that I haven't dropped all my ideals, 
because they seem so absurd and impossible to carry out. Yet I keep 
them, because in spite of everything I still believe that people are 
really good at heart. 
I simply can't build up my hopes on a foundation consisting of 
confusion, misery, and death, I see the world gradually being 
turned into a wilderness, I hear the ever approaching thunder, 
which will destroy us too, I can feel the suffering of millions and yet, 
if I look up into the heavens, I think that it will all come right, that 
this cruelty too will end, and that peace and tranquillity will return 
again. (Frank 694) 
J L V N N E FRANK, WHOSE famous Diary was first published in 
English in 1952, wrote the above entry in 1941, when she was 
fifteen years old. Her Diary, translated into numerous lan-
guages and adapted for the stage and screen, has become a cen-
tral artifact in the popular imagination of the Holocaust. 
Recently, a diary of a very different nature has come to light: the 
first volume of Victor Klemperer's / Will Bear Witness was pub-
lished in English translation in 1998; the second volume was 
published just this spring. Klemperer was, until his dismissal in 
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1935, a professor and chair of Romance languages and litera-
ture at Dresden Technical University in Germany. When the di-
ary entries begin in 1933, he is 51 years of age. Married to Eva 
Klemperer, a Protestant, since 1906, Victor Klemperer has him-
self been a convert to Protestantism for at least twenty years. He 
is a veteran of the First World War. He has been on the faculty at 
Dresden Technical University for 13 years, and has published 
numerous books and articles. 
I mention these facts to suggest the profound differences 
between these two authors, and their two diaries. Although 
Klemperer's book has been the subject of a 13-part television 
series in Germany, I doubt that it will inspire a Broadway play or 
Hollywood movie. Klemperer's diary entries do not offer up the 
readily consumable, easily narrativized, black-and-white senti-
mentality of the teen-aged naif, Anne Frank, who, because she 
is in hiding throughout her ordeal, has little contact with the 
outside world. Klemperer, by contrast, due to his status as a 
World War I veteran and his marriage to an Aryan, manages to 
avoid deportation to the concentration camps until, in Febru-
ary 1945, he is among the last 198 of the 1,265 registered Jews 
in Dresden. Although he suffers increasing privations and in-
dignities during the Nazi years, he is nonetheless able to pro-
vide an account of the Holocaust from within the Third Reich. 
In contrast to the majority of diaries written during this period, 
including Anne Frank's and even Klemperer's own, earlier vol-
ume of memoirs published in 1989, Klemperer appears to write 
these entries without any sense of their eventual publication, 
and without any retroactive narrativization or self-justification. 
As a result, the diaries give us a day-by-day sense of the Nazi 
party's growing strength and influence among ordinary Ger-
mans, and of the subtle ways that such power is consolidated on 
a micro-level. 
The diaries are especially important in that they manage to 
escape both iconoclasm and kitsch. Instead, by recording day-
by-day banalities, they teach us something about our own 
postmodern impasse, which, I suggest, is caught between, on 
the one hand, a feeling of incommensurability (between peo-
ple, between groups, between language games, between the 
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present and the past) and, on the other hand, a proliferation 
of mass-market simulacra. Klemperer's diaries respond at once 
to the intellectuals of the postmodern condition and to the 
anti-intellectualism of the masses, thus providing a lesson in 
the ethics of being a scholar, particularly a scholar of literature 
and culture. 
The interest of such an account can perhaps best be de-
scribed by another German-Jewish intellectual who, in despair, 
ended up committing suicide in 1940 on the Franco-Spanish 
border just weeks, or even days, before he might have escaped 
Vichy France. As Walter Benjamin writes, to articulate the past 
historically does not mean to recognize it '"the way it really 
was,'" but rather, "to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a 
moment of danger" (681), with all the complexly contending 
forces that make the future so uncertain in any given moment 
of time. Benjamin terms this moment of danger "Jetztzeit," lit-
erally, "the time of the now." Each entry in Klemperer's diary 
conveys the everyday effects of just such a moment of danger. 
For example, here is the entry for September 11, 1938: 
Mood of the public, of the workers in particular, is bad. If I talk to 
the butcher or the butter man here in Dresden, then there will be 
peace, but if (as the day before yesterday) I listen to Wolf, the car 
man, then so many of his mates have been fetched straight from 
work to the army again: "Things are coming to a head now!" If I 
read the newspaper, see and hear the film reports, then we're 
doing soooo well, we love the Fiihrer soo much and sooo 
unanimously — what is real, what is happening? That's how one 
experiences history. We know even less about today than about 
yesterday and no more than about tomorrow. (268) 
What one learns from Klemperer's diary entries is precisely 
what is left out of the history books. The diary describes what 
Hannah Arendt, in her book on the Eichmann trials, terms the 
"banality of evil" — the day-by-day inhumanities of the Nazi re-
gime and the oh-so-gradual radicalization of the prohibitions 
against the Jews, as well as the increasing acquiescence and fear 
of the German people. As Klemperer remarks, "the changing 
details of everyday life are precisely what is most important" 
(364); thus, "of the National Socialists' criminal and insane acts 
I only make a note of what somehow touches me personally. 
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Everything else can be looked up in the newspapers" (17). On 
August 17, 1937, for example, he writes: 
In the Stunner (which is displayed at every corner) I recently saw a 
picture: two girls in swimming costumes at a seaside resort. Above 
it: "Prohibited for Jews," underneath it: "How nice that it's just us 
now!" Then I remembered a long forgotten incident. September 
1900 or 1901 in Landsberg. In the lower sixth we were 4 Jews 
among 16, in the upper sixth 3 among 8 pupils. There was little 
trace of anti-Semitism among either the teachers or the pupils. 
More precisely none at a l l . . . . I knew only that ajew could become 
neither a fraternity member as a student nor an officer. [ . . . ] So 
on the Day of Atonement — Yom Kippur — the Jews did not attend 
classes. The next day our comrades told us, laughing and without 
the least malice (just as the words themselves were also only uttered 
jokingly by the altogether humane teacher), Kufahl, the math-
ematician, had said to the reduced class: "Today it's just us." In my 
memory these words took on a quite horrible significance: to me it 
confirms the claim of the NSDAP to express the true opinion of the 
German people. And I believe ever more strongly that Hitler really 
does embody the soul of the German people, that he really stands 
for "Germany" and that he will consequently maintain himself and 
justifiably maintain himself. Whereby I have not only outwardly lost 
my Fatherland. And even if the government should change one 
day: my inner sense of belonging is gone. . . . 
I hear from Marta [Klemperer's sister] . . . that Georg [his 
brother] is in Switzerland. He does not treat me with much 
affection. I believe he gives me all the money because 25 years ago 
he promised Father to help me. I believe that he is guided neither 
by fraternal love nor by any kind of respect for my work, convinced 
that I am not congenial to him and am to some extent con-
temptible. . . . But I have become a little thick-skinned and cynical 
as things stand, I have much more use for cash support than for 
fraternal respect and love. As I have already often observed, there is 
very little feeling for people left in me. Eva — and then comes 
Mujel, the tomcat. (233-34) 
Klemperer considers the events of his everyday life with the 
cynicism of an adult intellectual. We are a long way from Anne 
Frank's plaintive remark "I still believe that people are really 
good at heart." 
This is not to say that Klemperer neglects to record many acts 
of kindness and bravery. Indeed, his diary is compelling in that 
it presents us not with statistics — 6 million Jews killed, a 
German population of 90 million — but with descriptions of 
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individuals, both brave opponents of the regime, and collabora-
tors. Estreicher, for example, is a Jew who takes bribes: 
"People have already been begging me on their knees here and 
offering me two and three hundred marks and I throw them out 
and you, for whom I do so much, are ungrateful!" Then his injured 
vanity showed itself: "The mayor of Dolzschen was right in his 
judgment of you on the telephone — he did not know that I am a 
Jew. You want to be the great man, you are the famous scholar, and 
I am only little Estreicher! — But I am an official . . . " Ultimately I 
did not want to continue the quarrel. . . . The man is worse than 
any real Nazi. (333-334) 
Then there are those in power, for example, Constable Radke: 
A little while ago Constable Radke was here from the local council, 
I should come up to the council office because of the identity card. 
We had a friendly conversation, the man shook my hand, told me to 
keep my spirits up. We know from before that he is certainly no 
Nazi, that his sister is in difficulties, because her husband, a 
gardener, has a grandmother who is not Aryan. But then the next 
day, when I was up there, he happened to come through the room; 
he stared ahead as he went past, as much a stranger as possible. In 
his behavior the man probably represents 79 million Germans, 
perhaps half a million more than that rather than less. (283) 
Even more fascinating are the numbers of ordinary Germans 
that pass through these pages: 
Whom do I see, to whom do I listen? Natscheff, Berger, the grocer; 
the cigar dealer in Chemnitzer Strasse, who is a freemason, the 
charwoman, whose forty-year-old son is stationed in the West and 
who is on leave just now, the coal heavers. Vox populi disintegrates 
into voces populi. [ . . . ] — I often ask myself where all the wild 
anti-Semitism is. For my part I encounter much sympathy, people 
help me out, but fearfully of course. The women in the 
fishmonger's, Vogel, Berger, Frau Haeselbarth. [ . . . ] Yesterday I 
met Moses, the greengrocer, up in the village; he only rarely comes 
by now — lack of goods. "If you're not ashamed to carry a sack?" I 
was not ashamed and was given an unfrozen cabbage, a rutabaga 
and carrots — all rare delicacies. In addition a present of a bread 
coupon. Moses has repeatedly given Eva potatoes. It is well known 
that we are allocated fewer coupons than "comrades of the people." 
(329-330) 
By providing such details, / Will Bear Witness teaches us that 
there is an alternative to the two modes or strategies of repre-
senting Holocaust experience which are most current today. 
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The first strategy results from the belief that the Holocaust is 
indeed unrepresentable, because representation can only de-
tract from the reality of the horror. Claude Lanzmann, the di-
rector of the much-acclaimed Shoah, provides a perfect 
example of this attitude in his critique of Steven Spielberg's 
Schindler's List, the Holocaust, Lanzmann says, is 
unique in that it erects a ring of fire around itself, a borderline that 
cannot be crossed because there is a certain ultimate degree of 
horror that cannot be transmitted. To claim it is possible to do so is 
to be guilty of the most serious transgression. I deeply believe there 
are some things that cannot and should not be represented. (14)" 
Lanzmann goes so far as to extend his injunction against repre-
sentation to historical documentation itself: "If I had stumbled 
on a real SS film — a secret film, because filming was strictly for-
bidden—that showed how 3,000 Jewish men, women and chil-
dren were gassed in Auschwitz's crematorium 2, not only would 
I not have shown it but I would have destroyed it" (14). I term 
this first strategy "Holocaust iconoclasm." It amounts to a com-
mandment — "Thou shalt not represent me directly" — and 
thus threatens to theologize the potent and still potential vio-
lence of the horror as an inhuman, almost divine manifestation. 
"Holocaust iconoclasm" finds its mirror image in the mode 
that I describe as "Nazi kitsch." This second strategy attests to 
the fact that, despite the sense of ineffability surrounding Nazi 
atrocities, we still feel the need to represent this trauma in our 
political unconscious. The sheer number of films about the era, 
which pop up like so many returns of the repressed, seem to 
testify to this need, from Cabaret to The Diary of Anne Frank, from 
Indiana Jones to Schindler's List.3 Even in these films, however — 
and here we may begin to see how these two strategies are in 
fact closely linked — the Holocaust itself, which certainly 
grounds our sense of the era's "evil," remains always at the mar-
gins, beyond or at the limits of representation, as the supra-
natural essence of evil.4 
So, on the one hand, a theologization of the Holocaust — 
think of the very word, "Holocaust," chosen to describe it; on 
the other, the demonization of Nazi Germany through Holly-
wood stereotypes. Does the iconoclasm of the first strategy serve 
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only to hide the fear — instilled to some extent by Nazi 
kitsch — that there is nothing behind any representation of the 
terror but other representations, and do not both these strate-
gies therefore play into the very hands of those who would deny 
that the Holocaust ever happened? Have the endless cultural 
representations of the Nazi period — which have proliferated 
and become such a part of our imagination that we can have 
Storm Troopers in Star Wars — become a substitute for the 
pure and intelligible Idea of Terror, just as, for the Puritan 
Iconoclasts, "the visible machinery of icons... substituted for the 
pure and intelligible Idea of God" (Baudrillard 8)? The prob-
lem with Holocaust iconoclasm is that it accompanies, as Anton 
Kaes suggests, an apocalyptic and postmodern sense of "post-
histoire" where representation fails before the rupture of the 
past. We are left, Kaes argues, with only "elegaic memories of 
past glories, nostalgia, and a sense of waiting for apocalypse" 
(219). 5 Since truth or history can no longer be figured directly, 
we can only defer justice eschatologically, to an apocalypse be-
yond representation. The side-effect is that we collapse our re-
sponsible connection with past crimes onto an eternal present 
of equally invalid intertexts and interpretations that fail before 
the apocalyptic sublime of an ineffable horror. The connection 
to the second strategy — Nazi kitsch — is clear. Might we not in 
fact call this second strategy the symptom of the refusal to work 
through traumatic experience? We thus absolve ourselves of re-
sponsibility and obviate the need to deal with our guilt by pro-
jecting our anxiety for past horrors or our fear of the potential 
for horror in our own system onto another object, a Holocaust 
memorial, for example, or a Hollywood image of Nazism — the 
aesthetic detachment of the monument, on the one hand, the 
pleasures of narrative on the other. 
According to Jean Baudrillard, the religious "iconolaters" 
who allowed God to appear "in the mirror of images" in fact 
"already enacted his death and his disappearance in the 
epiphany of his representations" and accepted the fact that "Be-
hind the baroque of images [only] hides the grey eminence of 
politics" (Baudrillard, Simulations 9-10). Perhaps the same may 
be said about this baroque of Nazi pastiche, for, as in 
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Baudrillard's examinadon of Watergate, this scandal of scan-
dals acts "as a means to regenerate a moral and political princi-
ple"; this imaginary acts "as a means to regenerate a reality 
principle in distress" (Baudrillard, Simulations 27). We need a 
fantasy-image of Nazism against which we can positively define 
our own identity and from which we can differentiate our un-
cannily similar form of technological capitalism. We must con-
vince ourselves that a moral and political principle can still exist 
after a regime that could in effect construct reality upon 
simulacra, through a Chamber of Culture that could recreate 
German identity in terms of nostalgic kitsch and the constant 
regeneration of the perception of crisis. In this way, Nazism was 
able to counter, while at the same time accounting for, its own 
technological capitalism through a logic of negativity. The con-
centration camps became the unreal horror/fantasy against 
which the rest of German society was able to define its sense of 
reality. In Nazism we have an example of the power and legiti-
mation inherent in "proving the real by the imaginary, proving 
truth by scandal, proving the law by transgression. . . . proving 
the system by crisis and capital by revolution" (Baudrillard, 
Simulations 36) . 6 The point to be made is that we too need our 
Hollywood stereotypes as well as our Holocaust memorials in 
order to hide the fact that our own society is, perhaps, not 
founded on any inherent moral and political truths but rather 
on the same logic of late capitalism that engendered Nazism. 
Klemperer's diary proleptically responds to the two predomi-
nant ways of dealing with Holocaust experience in postmodern 
culture. On the one hand, he describes the period in all its mi-
nutiae, thus giving us a sense not of its inexpressibility but 
rather of its very real, perhaps also still threatening possibility. 
On the other hand, he refuses to demonize the German peo-
ple. In this way, the book is quite distinct from Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen's much-discussed work, Hitler's Willing Executioners: 
Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. Like Goldhagen, Klemperer 
does make it clear that the German people were responsible for 
making the system work. As early as August 19, 1933, 
Klemperer is writing that "No letter, no telephone conversa-
tion, no word on the street is safe anymore. Everyone fears the 
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next person may be an informer" (31). Robert Gellately, in The 
Gestapo and German Society, has proven that Gestapo agents gen-
erated as little as 15% of the information that the secret police 
received about Jews living in Nazi Germany. A majority of the 
information (at least 57%) came from civilian denunciations. 
The fact that such civilian denunciations were not forthcoming 
in, for example, Denmark, Italy or Bulgaria, is precisely what 
prevented the race laws from being implemented with as much 
success in those countries. Unlike Goldhagen, however, 
Klemperer shows that the Nazi system persisted not because of 
the rabid anti-Semitism of the majority of Germans, but as the 
result of a sequence of mundane, banal acts — the gradually 
increased violence of a few, the greed of many, the acquies-
cence and fear of the majority. What is so valuable about this 
first volume of Klemperer's diaries, including as they do the 
years 1933 to 1941, is that they demonstrate the gradual "mak-
ing-banal" of extremism. In this way, they illustrate the need still 
to remember today the events of this period. 
Allow me to share a personal anecdote: When I taught a class 
on "Nazisms and Nationalisms" at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara a number of years ago, one of the exercises I had 
my students conduct was to put Adolf Eichmann on trial again. 
Eichmann was a bureaucrat in Nazi Germany, whose job it was 
to coordinate the daunting transportation project of moving 
eleven million Jews, homosexuals, Gypsies, and others from 
across Europe to the various concentration camps in and 
around Germany. He signed papers, followed orders, and was 
very good at his job. As he said repeatedly during his interroga-
tion, "A subordinate doesn't interpret an order any more . . . 
than his superior officer justifies it. The commander has to take 
the responsibility. That's why the commander has the higher 
rank" (von Lang 272). When I first set up the parameters of the 
trial, I worried about asking students to defend a Nazi responsi-
ble for making possible the destruction of so many people. The 
experience, however, turned out to be an eye-opener. I taught 
the course four times, ran the exercise four times, and every 
time found that students were more than willing to see 
Eichmann's side, that the prosecution councils had all sorts of 
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problems coming up with convincing arguments, that students 
concurred with Eichmann's self-justification. Out of four trials, 
Eichmann got off three times. This anecdote is not meant 
to suggest that another Holocaust is imminent; it is meant to 
suggest that contemporary societies are not immune to the 
banalization of evil. As Stanley Milgram writes in the Postscript 
to the famous psychological experiment in which he tested the 
willingness of American men, ages 20 to 50, to inflict danger-
ous levels of shock to victims, the results were "disturbing": 
They raise the possibility that human nature, or — more speci-
fically — the kind of character produced in American democratic 
society, cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality 
and inhumane treatment at the direction of malevolent authority. 
A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, 
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of 
conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from 
a legitimate authority. (75) 
What is most affecting and most inspirational about Victor 
Klemperer's diaries is that throughout, he refuses to submit to 
this authority, even as he watches other Jews acquiescing or, 
worse, collaborating with the local authorities. Klemperer's di-
ary is also inspirational in that it represents an individual's un-
willingness to desist from the act that is the first guarantee of 
individual freedom: expression. I would argue that the very ba-
sis of humanity is the expressive act by which one calls upon an 
other for recognition. You sense this power of the other the 
moment any person enters a room in which you are alone: you 
defer, you take the other into account, and act differently as a 
result. The simple act of saying "hello" to an acquaintance is the 
daily affirmation of this humanity, and one reason why the en-
forced Nazi salute in public, "heil Hitler," was so insidious, as if 
one thereby stated, "I no longer recognize you except through 
the state." Klemperer recognizes the need to resist crimes 
against humanity by bearing witness. As he writes on May 27, 
1941, after working on his memoirs, entitled Curriculum Vitae, 
I am working through the diary pages of Vilna '18, reading them 
first of all. How much I had forgotten, how immensely important 
are precisely the details of such a time! For the sake of my 
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Curriculum I must make notes even now, I must, no matter how 
dangerous it is. That is my professional courage. Certainly I also put 
other people at risk. But there is nothing else I can do" (386-87). 
What is revealing about the gradual Nazi prohibitions against 
Jews is that, from the beginning, they strike especially hard at 
this right of the Jews to be heard. Each new prohibition chips 
away at the human right of recognition by others: The ban on 
Jews owning cars, on entering parks, on using public libraries, 
cinemas, or swimming pools; the eventual ghettoization of Jews; 
the bans on telephones, radios and typewriters; the ban on own-
ing pets (Victor is eventually forced to euthanize his beloved 
tomcat, Mujel); the yellow star; all lead, finally, to the concen-
tration camps. Throughout, what Klemperer recognizes as the 
ultimate sine qua non of his humanity is his speech and, 
throughout all the other indignities, he remains determined 
still to speak — to write his academic book, and then, when he 
is denied access to libraries and even his own books, to write his 
memoirs and his diary. 
Klemperer's resistance to the Nazi regime is also marked by 
his refusal to cease asking questions about what is going on 
around him. This "professional courage," I would argue, indi-
cates Klemperer's significance as an intellectual. We live in a 
time of anti-intellectualism, when the university professor is in-
creasingly under fire from the general public and the general 
press. Anti-intellectualism is evident in calls to eliminate tenure 
and to limit research by liberal arts faculty. It permeates popu-
lar culture to the extent that even university students adopt 
what I describe as a "pose of ignorance." Anti-intellectualism 
persists, I believe, because it is seen as a sign of common hu-
manity, of a lack of hubris and pretension. But as Klemperer 
writes, the first goal of tyranny is "the suppression of the urge to 
ask questions" (254). Perhaps it is not so surprising that the one 
public show of opposition to Nazism in Klemperer's diaries is 
caused by a piece of so-called "high" literature, as he explains in 
the entry for October 6, 1934: 
Salzburg Sr. related as absolutely vouched-for an incident at a 
performance of [Friedrich von Schiller's play] Don Carlos in 
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Hamburg. At Posa's words, "Sire, allow freedom of thought!" there 
were several minutes of applause. The next day Don Carlos was 
dropped from every theater, including Dresden. (91) 
Victor Klemperer is a professor of literature and, as such, he 
offers his own defense of higher education and of literary stud-
ies in the pages of his diary. To read, to speak, to question, to 
think critically — these are what it is to be human; these are our 
last guarantees against oppression and injustice. 
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